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RICHARD STEWART'S PERENNIAL
QUESTION: "HOW'S THIS GOING TO
WORK?"
DAVID SCHOENBROD*

The members of this panel were asked to assess Richard Stewart's contributions to administrative law, but my knowledge of that
field is too fragmentary to capture the totality of his sweeping im-

pact. I will instead focus on only a minor part of it, but in a way that,
I hope, sheds light on why his overall impact has been so great. That
minor part is his effect on one lesser scholar, me. Showing why he

had such a huge impact on my work over the decades will suggest
why he has enriched the work of so many around him and has
thereby improved the law.

I
My first encounter with Dick's scholarship came in the aftermath of part of my work at the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), representing environmental groups in the litigation campaign to get the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to protect

children from lead in gasoline. The authors of the Clean Air Act of
1970 had told voters that they had given EPA a mandatory duty to

issue rules that would fully protect public health from airborne lead.'
The Second Circuit agreed with our complaint, which charged that
the Agency was failing to discharge its duty to protect health by
1976.2 Although our courtroom victories did prod the agency to act

a bit faster, EPA under both Republicans and Democrats did little
* Trustee Professor, New York Law School; Senior Fellow, Niskanen Center.
I am grateful for the excellent assistance of Michael Falbo, New York Law School
class of 2021.
1 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C §§ 7401-7671q) [hereinafter Clean Air Act];

DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 29-30

(2005).
2 See Nat. Res. Def. Council., Inc. v. Train, 545 F.3d 320, 328 (2d Cir. 1976).
Whether or not the court's reading of the statute was correct, that the judges so
decided is understandable given Congress's promise on lead and the dreadful consequences of failing to keep it.
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during the 1970s in response to the threat to health from lead in gasoline. 3
To understand what had gone wrong, I left NRDC for academia
in 1979. The problem, I came to see, was that legislators of both
parties had in 1970 loudly taken credit for the promise to fully protect health but had shifted to the agency the responsibility to deliver.4 Meanwhile, some legislators, including progressive Democrats, found it expedient to quietly pressure EPA to go slow on lead.5

If, in contrast, Congress had voted on the rule limiting lead rather
than delegating making the rule to EPA, its members would get the
blame for the shortfall in protecting health. The legislators would
also have been responsible for the economic burdens of protection.
Such responsibility would likely have deterred the legislators from
enacting a rule completely protecting health, as the Clean Air Act

had promised.
Nonetheless, lead in gasoline would have been cut faster had
Congress itself made the rule. Congress had to legislate on air pollution, and lead was the air pollution issue most on the public's
mind.6 As Ethyl Corporation executive Lawrence Blanchard Jr.
stated, "'Get the lead out' has become a slogan in every household." We cannot know exactly what rule on lead Congress would
have enacted, but it is suggestive that Congress enacted a rule requiring auto manufacturers to cut new cars' emissions of other pollutants by 90 percent from 1970 levels by 1975.8 Congress would

not have taken all the lead out, but a cautious estimate is that Congress would have called for a 50 percent reduction in the lead content of gasoline by 1975. Using EPA's health data and conservative

assumptions about what Congress would have done if the option of
taking credit for protecting health by delegating had been
3 Most of the cuts in lead in gasoline during the 1970s were to protect the
emission control equipment in new cars, starting with the 1975 model year. The
agency had required that new cars-starting with the 1975 model year-use unleaded gasoline not to protect health but rather to protect the emission control
equipment needed to reduce emissions of other pollutants. The goal of my litigation was to reduce lead in the leaded gasoline used by the 100 million older cars
still on the road in 1975. See SCHOENBROD, supranote 1, at ch. 4.
4 See id. at 9.
' See id. at 31.
6 See id at chs. 3-4.
7 Jaime Lincoln Kitman, The Secret History ofLead, NATION (Mar. 2, 2000),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/secret-history-lead/.
8 See Clean Air Act § 202.
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foreclosed, I have estimated the health consequences of the delay
brought on by Congress's evading responsibility: brain damage in
tens of thousands children sufficient to permanently reduce their IQs

below 70 and almost as many dead Americans as those who died in
the Vietnam War. 9 In sum, by evading accountability for the hard
choice on lead, members of Congress had served themselves at the
expense of their constituents.
In response to this injustice, I set out to write an article arguing

that Congress itself should enact the federal rules limiting air pollution.' 0 It had done so for new cars" and could have done so for lead
in gasoline. Yet, there was a problem: I had trouble seeing how Con-

gress could do so for stationary sources, given the need to take account of the wide variations in the sources' costs of controlling
emissions. That seemed like an impossibly complex job for a legislature.
Then, however, I read Richard Stewart's newly published article in the 1981 CaliforniaLaw Review, Regulation, Innovation, and
2
Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework.' It showed that

Congress could tackle such a problem through market-based devices

3
such as emission fees or transferable pollution rights.' Such methods would allow Congress to leave the market to take account of
widely varying emission control costs. Dick thus provided the key-

stone for my article.1 4 Although we had not yet met, he generously

9 EPA found that the reduction in lead in gasoline that the Clean Air Act actually achieved in a single year-1980-prevented 6,960 deaths and saved 20,100
children from having their IQs reduced below 70. However, had the statute required a 50% reduction in lead in gasoline by 1975, the additional reduction in
lead in gasoline in 1980 and other years from 1971 to 1985 would have been about
seven times larger than that actually achieved in 1980. See SCHOENBROD, supra
note 1, at 34-37. Seven times 6,960 is 48,720, which suggests that the additional
deaths from Congress ducking responsibility on lead comes close to the 58,220
American deaths in the Vietnam War. See DAVID A. BLUM & NESE F. DEBRUYNE,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., AMERICAN WAR AND MILITARY OPERATIONS CASUALTIES:

dead from all
(stating 58,220
STATISTICS 9 (2020)
LISTS AND
causes), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32492.pdf.
10 See David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the
Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740 (1983).
' See id. at 761, 778.
12 See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, andAdministrative Law: A
Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1256 (1981).
'3 See id. at 1326-37.
14 See Schoenbrod, supra note 10, at 803-16.
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read a draft and gave me valuable suggestions. My article cited

Richard Stewart more than anyone else.
More fundamentally, and of enduring importance, Dick's 1981
article introduced scholars, me included, to a new way of thinking
about administrative law. The old way focused on the expertise of
disinterested regulators. It called for the legislature to enact statutes
requiring direct experts-supposedly insulated from politics-to is-

sue rules designed to achieve objectives stated in legislation. The
regulators would use their expertise to fmd the best means to reconcile any conflicts between those objectives. Dick showed how the
old way could be inadequate in the context of the command-andcontrol statutes that Congress had passed in the early 1970s to limit
pollution, especially the Clean Air Act.15 That statute required EPA

to impose and enforce rules limiting emissions sufficiently to
achieve national standards of ambient air quality by given statutory
deadlines.1 6 To bridge the gap between emission limits sufficient to
achieve ambient standards and the emission limits that current
plants could achieve, the statute relied upon "technology forcing."17
The idea was that agency experts would identify new, affordable
technologies to control pollution and force their use by setting emissions limits at levels that these technologies could meet.
Of this statutory design, Dick asked the question that he perennially asks, although not necessarily in these words: "how is this
going to work?" His answer was, in short: not very well. Technol-

ogy forcing could not work as the legislators had hoped because
agency experts would likely know less about how much a firm could
cut pollution than would the firm itself. 18 The firms, for their part,

do not want to tell the agency of better ways to limit pollution or to
invent them because that would bring them the perverse reward of
having to pay to install and operate additional pollution control
measures. 19 Thus, not surprisingly, EPA repeatedly missed statutory

deadlines to achieve environmental goals.

15 See Stewart, supra note 12, at 1288-1312.
16 See Clean Air Act §§ 108-110.
17 See Stewart, supra note 12, at 1296-1307 (discussing technology-forcing
regulations).
18 See id at 1282.
19 See id at 1283 ("The regulated industry has no incentive-in fact, a powerful disincentive-to develop or disclose promising inventions that would facilitate
higher levels of social performance.").
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In sum, Dick's new approach to administrative law focused on
not only the expertise of regulators but also on who has the relevant
knowledge and who has incentives to use that knowledge to achieve

statutory objectives. Limited but tradeable emission rights would incentivize firms to use their superior knowledge of how to cut emissions to meet statutory targets.

Dick's analysis also showed that the Clean Air Act discouraged
the construction of new plants. 20 The statute directed EPA to impose

especially strict nation-wide emission limits on- new plants in order
to prevent the disruption that would come from firms fleeing the
more industrialized areas that would need tougher emission limits
in order to meet ambient standards and relocating to less polluted
states where they could get by with laxer limits.21 On top of the cost
of meeting the strict emission limits, the permitting process for new

plants brought administrative costs, uncertainty, and delay and so
discouraged their construction. 22 Yet, as Dick's article argued, new,
plants provide the best opportunity to introduce technologies that

both reduce pollution and make the economy more productive. 23 He
showed that, in contrast with command-and-control regulation, market-based approaches would create a level playing field for new and
existing plants and simplify the building of new plants.24

As Dick's article concludes, "the dominant concerns of the current regulatory system are enforcement, uniformity, and avoidance

of disruption." 2 These concerns dominate because failure to
achieve them would bring blame to Congress and EPA. In contrast,
innovation gets short shrift because blame for discouraging it does =
not readily get pinned on Congress or EPA. 26 Yet, innovation is vital

because it increases our ability to both achieve regulatory goals and
boost economic productivity. The article's new way of thinking

about administrative law thus used insights from economics about
incentivizing those with the relevant knowledge to use it in a so-

cially beneficial way. 27
20 See id at 1270-81.

21 See Clean Air Act § 111; Stewart, supra note 12 at 1299, 1314.
22 See Stewart, supra note 12, at 1280-81, 1317-18.
23 See id. at 1285.
24 See id at 1313-15.
25 Id at 1288.
26 See id .at 1262, 1288.
27 The article applied these insights not just to propose market-based regulatory tools, but also to propose modifications of traditional command-and-control
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Later, Dick, writing with Bruce Ackerman, further explored
this theme in Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, published in the Stan-

ford Law Review in 1985.28 Dick and Bruce included cap-and-trade
among the market-based devices that would foster innovation. 29
They noted that by enacting cap-and-trade, the legislature could, in
setting the cap, itself decide how much to reduce pollution. 30 Meanwhile, by deciding how to allocate tradeable emission rights (such
as for example through an auction or in proportion to firms' current
emissions), Congress could take responsibility for distributional decisions. In other words, Congress itself could make the rules of private conduct-that is, the laws that regulate the conduct of private
persons, including businesses and other private institutions. Stewart
and Ackerman's emphasis was, however, different than mine.
Theirs was on using economic incentives, whether enacted by Congress or promulgated by an agency to achieve regulatory goals.
Mine was on getting Congress to enact the rules of conduct.
Dick's argument for harnessing the market for regulatory purposes has had a remarkable impact on policy, even though, as he and
Ackerman noted, "[t]he congressional committees, government bureaucracies, and industry and environmental groups that have
helped to shape the present system want to see it perpetuated." 3' For
example, only a few years after his 1981 article was published, EPA
adopted a trading program to cut the lead content of leaded gasoline
faster and more efficiently than otherwise would have been possible. 32 EPA later adopted a cap-and-trade approach to control certain
other major pollutants such as particulate matter and ozone, but with
the Agency, rather than Congress, taking responsibility for the rules
of private conduct.33

regulation; a greater use of damage awards and subsidies, and changes in government decisional processes. See id. at 1261, 1312-74.
28 See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333 (1985).
29 Cap-and-trade was called a "system of tradeable rights." Id. at 1341.
30 See id. at 1341-42, 1353.
31 Id. at 1334.
32 See id. at 1348-49. That EPA got more aggressive on lead in gasoline in the
1980s is, however, explicable. Major oil companies had decided by then that they
would profit by no longer selling leaded gasoline. Thus, it became less politically
precarious to support aggressive action. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 1, at 35.
3 For a discussion of these programs, see Bill Pedersen & David Schoenbrod,
The Overwhelming Case for Clean Air Act Reform, 43 ENv'T L. REP. 10,969
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Now, against the background of these and other successes, it
may not be obvious how pioneering Dick's 1981 article was. Yet,
up until its publication, no legal academic had, to my knowledge,

called for market-based approaches to pollution control. The reason
was in part mistaken moralizing about pollution. To get a flavor of

the times, consider that Ralph Nader in 1970 called those who emit
34
pollution "smoggers," thus analogizing them to muggers. From
this perspective, allowing people to pay to pollute would be like allowing them to pay to mug. Now, however, it is clear that even the

most back-to-basics members of our society contribute to pollution
to some extent. The relevant question is how best to reduce that pollution, and Dick showed that market-based approaches are dexterous policy tools.
What, aside from his asking the right question-how is this go-

ing to work?-made Dick the pioneer? The answer, aside from his
intelligence and concern for society, is his use of the insights of economics to propose improvements in administrative law. In conver-

sation with me, Dick has ascribed his early use of these insights to
his joining the board of the Environmental Defense Fund in 1977.

Its staff included an economist who, Dick could see, was doing valuable work. In contrast, most environmental groups had no staff

economist in 1977.35 NRDC, for instance, had none and some of its
leaders were dubious about market-based approaches.
That raises the question of why I, despite being a veteran of

NRDC myself, agreed with Dick's argument and, indeed, ran with
it. Dick played a role here too, but a serendipitous one. Two decades.
before his article came out-on January 4, 1961 to be precise-I, as
a freshman, read on the front page of the Yale Daily News a headline
that four seniors, including one named Richard Stewart, had gotten

scholarships to study at Oxford. 36 The story included their photos.

(2013), http://elr.info/news-analysis/43/10969/overwhelming-case-clean-air-actreform.
34 See Ralph Nader, Foreword to JOHN C. ESPOSITO, VANISHING AIR: THE
RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT ON AIR POLLUTION, at vii-ix (1970).
3 According to a 2016 report, EDF was the first environmental group to hire
a full-time PhD economist on staff. ANNUAL REPORT 2016, ENV'T DEF. FUND 1
(2016), http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF AR2016.pdf.
36 See Bardel, Kinsolving, Post, Stewart Get Rhodes Scholarshipsfor Study at
Oxford, YALE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 4, 1961, at 1, http://digital.library.yale.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/yale-ydn/id/45561/rec/25.
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It dawned upon on me that I too might get to study at Oxford
and even get a scholarship to do so. I molded my college career to
that end and succeeded. At Oxford, I studied and taught economics
and even published in a prominent economics journal. 37
During my studies, I got to see the foibles of top-down economic planning, which later helped me accept Dick's argument
about the problems of top-down pollution-control planning. On a
trip to Budapest in 1964, I delivered to the U.S. ambassador a letter
from Senator Hubert Humphrey stating that I had been helpful in his
ongoing push for centralized economic planning in the United States
and asking the ambassador to arrange for me to meet with Hungarian economic planners. Consequently, I was invited to the home of
the head planner on a Sunday morning. After being seated and
handed a little glass of plum brandy, I expected to hear him sing thepraises of central planning. Instead, he damned the Hungarian system. To paraphrase:
"The factory managers focus on getting themselves promoted rather than making what Hungarians need."
I replied, "surely you set quotas requiring them to meet these
needs."
-

His response was "yes, we do set quotas, but the managers fulfill
the quotas without regard to whether their products are useful to
Hungarians and we in Budapest lack the information needed to
stop them from gaming the system for their private advantage."

37 See G. A. Hone & D. S. Schoenbrod, U.S. Steel Imports and Vertical Oligopoly Power: Comment, 56 AM. ECON. REv. 156 (1966).
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Having learned of the problems of top-down economic planning but being unfamiliar with administrative law scholarshiphaving not taken or taught administrative law-when I first read
Dick's 1981 article, I thought that its approach to administrative law

was powerful but did not realize how new it was to the field. I simply
internalized it, and it has been central to my work ever since.
II
In contrast to the success of Dick's argument, especially in getting agencies to adopt market-based approaches, my argument that
Congress should itself adopt the rules of private conduct in pollution
control has had next to no impact. 38

Having failed to persuade the legislators themselves to make
the rules, I undertook a second approach: urging the courts to bar
Congress from delegating the power to make rules of private conduct. In this, I learned from Dick again, but this time the hard wayby not taking his advice soon enough.
I published an article in 1985 arguing that the Supreme Court

had prevented itself from stopping delegation because it had
39
adopted the judicially unmanageable "intelligible principle" test.

The Court should instead, I argued, adopt the test inherent in the
meaning of Article I of the Constitution: that Congress may not

38 Existing cap-and-trade programs to deal with pollutants other than acid rain
came through rules promulgated by the agency rather than enacted by Congress.
Congress does not generally adopt cap-and-trade or other market-based rules because doing so would subject its members to blame for both the burdens imposed
and the extent to which the program does not fully protect the environment. The
one instance where Congress itself enacted itself a market-based rule, the acid rain
program, was forced upon it because a fully fleshed-out program to deal with acid
rain was necessary to get air pollution legislation passed in 1990 and a failure to
legislate in 1990 would itself be a source of blame. See DAVID SCHOENBROD,
RICHARD

B.

STEWART

&

KATRINA

M.

WYMAN,

BREAKING

THE

LOGJAM:

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION THAT WILL WORK 6-7 (2010). That meant that the

agency had to shoehorn these programs into the existing constraints of the Clean
Air Act, which made these programs much less effective and efficient than they
otherwise could have been. Congress's failure to enact the cap-and-trade programs
*means more pollution, which will cut short the life of the average American 30year old by a year, as Bill Pedersen and I have shown. See Pedersen & Schoenbrod,
supra note 33.
39 See David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It
Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985).
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delegate the power to make rules of private conduct. 40 This test, I
contended, would be judicially manageable. 41
In 1987, Dick and I were among the speakers at a symposium
on delegation. This was the first time I met him in person. At the

symposium, Dick argued that my test was infeasible because it
would nullify most of the Code of Federal Regulations. 42 Characteristically, he was not putting me down or scoring a point but rather
urging me to address that perennial question: how is this going to
work?
I sought to answer in writing a book on delegation, in which I
argued that the heft of the Code of Federal Regulations was itself a
consequence of delegation. 43 In other words, if Congress had to take
responsibility for the rules, it would enact simpler, more marketbased rules and leave more matters to the states. Yet, I had to
acknowledge that Congress could not enact a simpler set of rules of
conduct overnight. So, the book argued that the Court should invoke
equitable discretion to allow for a period of transition."
Thinking about that argument now, I can hear Dick saying,
"how is this going to work precisely? How long will the period of
transition be? How will Congress comply? If it does not comply,
what would.the Court do?" My book failed to answer these questions with precision.
I came to appreciate the insufficiency of my answers after my

book on delegation was published. Three now-retired but then-sitting Supreme Court justices, from the left, right, and center, pri-

vately indicated to me that they wished to curb delegation if they
knew of a workable way of doing so. Dick had warned me, but I had
no response. That became painfully obvious after the District of Columbia Circuit, reportedly partly on the basis of my book, 45 held that
the Clean Air Act as interpreted by EPA unconstitutionally
40 See id at 1252-71.
41 See id. at 1281-83. An opinion of the Court later cited this argument, though
not in the delegation context. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 927 (1997).
42 See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV.
323, 327 (1987).
43 See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION x, 3 (1993).

How

4 See id. at 174-77.
45 See John J. Fialka, Professor Seeks to Limit Congress Ability to Delegate
Tasks to Federal Agencies, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 1999, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB927150035434840424.
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delegated legislative power. 46 The Supreme Court, of course,

granted certiorari in the case that became Whitman v. American
Trucking Associations, which refused to impose a constitutional
limit on delegation. 47

III
At that sad point, I turned my attention to a third approach to
the objective of getting Congress to take responsibility for the rules
of private conduct, and this time I listened to Dick's advice. The
project was a book explaining to people interested in environmental
protection how Congress's delegation of the power to make the rules
paired with the centralization of authority over environmental regu-

lation in Washington was hurting both the environment and the public. 4 8 Yale University Press asked Professor Stewart to review the
manuscript. He gave it a thumbs up but suggested that I add an appendix describing the changes in the various environmental statutes
needed to implement my broad suggestions. In other words, he sug-

gested that the book should explain precisely how my proposal
would work. Given his generosity of spirit, he told the Press that it
could reveal to me who wrote this review.
I told the Press that my argument would be stronger with a detailed design for statutory reform as Dick had suggested, but that
there were so many quite different sorts of environmental statutes
needing reform that such an appendix would swallow the book.4 9
So, I suggested to the Press and Dick that we join forces to write an
additional book that explains the changes needed in the statutes.
That he would accept this invitation seemed a hope too good to
come true.

Yet, to my elation, Dick did say "yes" and thus began the
Breaking the Logjam project headed by him, Professor Katrina
46 See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA (A TA 1), 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (per curiam), modified on reh'g,Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA (A TA
II), 195 F.3d 4, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). See also Fialka,
supra note 45.
47 See Am. Trucking Ass 'ns, 531 U.S. at 486 (2001) (allowing Congress to delegate so long as it provides vacuous guidance to the agency on how it should make
the rules of private conduct).
48 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 1.
49 The number and diversity is evident in the many statutes discussed in
SHOENBROD, STEWART & WYMAN, supra note 38.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

414

N.Y. U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Volume 29

Wyman, and me. 50 Because the environmental statutes are many,
different, and complicated, we needed the help of specialists. About
fifty environmental experts from across the ideological spectrum
wrote articles proposing changes in a wide array of statutes.5 1 The
proposals focused on how to get more environmental bang for the

buck rather than how clean was clean enough. These articles were
discussed at a symposium and published in an issue of the New York
52
University EnvironmentalLaw Journal.
Later, Dick, Katrina, and
I wrote a book summarizing the project's recommendations 53 and

reports to both the members of Congress and the President who took
office in 2009.54
It was wonderful working with both Dick and Katrina, but he
is the topic now and so here is one tiny example of the many epiphanies that came from working with him. On the basis that Congress
had not updated most of the environmental statutes for more than
two decades-despite experience showing how those statutes could
be more effective and efficient-I wrote in a draft that such statutes
are "obsolete." In response, Dick kindly, but pointedly, termed the
statutes "obsolescent" rather than "obsolete." He was, of course,
correct. The statutes were still useful even though they could be

made a lot more useful. I had written "obsolete" to be dramatic, but
Dick's amendment helped me see that the drama came at price of
weakening an otherwise powerful argument through overstatement.
Dick and I went together to Washington to talk to the incoming
presidential administration and then the new Congress to urge pas-

sage of our recommendations. (Katrina was then focused on another
50 See Background, BREAKING THE LOGJAM, https://www.breakingthelogjam.org/background/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2021).
51 See Symposium, Breaking the Logjam: EnvironmentalReform for the New
Conyess andAdministration, Symposium Agenda, 17 N.Y.U. ENV'T L.J. 1(2008).
5 See id. For the event's program, see Symposium Agenda: Breaking the Logjam, Environmental Reform for the New Congress and Administration, N.Y.U.
(2008),
https://nylssites.wpengine.com/breakingthelogjam/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2014/06/Symposium Agenda.pdf.
5 See SHOENBROD, STEWART & WYMAN, supra note 38.
54 See DAVID SCHOENBROD, RICHARD B. STEWART & KATRINA M. WYMAN,
BREAKING THE LOGJAM: PROJECT REPORT (Feb. 2009), https://nylssites.wpen-

gine.com/breakingthelogjam/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2014/06/BreakingLogDAVID SCHOENBROD, RICHARD B. STEWART & KATRINA M.
WYMAN, BREAKING THE LOGJAM: ANNEX TO PROJECT REPORT (Feb. 2009),
https://nylssites.wpengine.com/breakingthelogjam/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2014/06/ClimateReportvlr4.pdf.

jamReportfmal.pdf,
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vital matter.) Both Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill told

us that they wished our proposals were already enacted but that Congress would not do so because its members did not want to take responsibility. In contrast, the existing statutes had been optimized to

let legislators claim credit for popular promises and shift blame for
the unpopular consequences."

Thus, despite great help from Dick, I had failed three times to
achieve my objective of getting the legislators to serve their constit-

uents rather than themselves: first, in urging Congress to itself make
the rules limiting pollution; second, in urging the Court to stop Congress from delegating the power to make the rules of private conduct; and third, in urging Congress to change how it delegates the
power to regulate the environment in order to make the resulting

rules more effective and efficient.
In reflecting on this last failure, Dick and I recognized an irony.
If Congress had to vote on the rules that the agencies promulgate,

its members would bear blame for the protection not delivered and
the burdens imposed. In that case, they would want to adopt statutory changes that, like our proposals, would enable agencies to put

forth rules that produce more environmental protection bang for the
buck.
IV
That recognition started me on a fourth approach to the same
objective: to write a book explaining to citizens how Congress's

ducking responsibility serves its members and disserves their constituents. 56 The book, DC Confidential: Inside the Five Tricks of
Washington, would show how changes to the manner in which Con-

gress has operated over the past half century have allowed its members to claim credit for the popular yet evade blame for the unpopular, not just on environmental protection but on everything from war
to the government loan guarantees that helped cause the fiscal crisis

of 2008.
Although I could not call upon Dick for help as much as I would

have liked in this project, I still needed to answer his question: how
would the book's proposals work? To use regulation as an example,

I suggested a reform based on a recommendation from James
5

See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.

56

See DAVID SCHOENBROD, DC CONFIDENTIAL: INSIDE THE FIVE TRICKS OF

WASHINGTON

4-7 (2017).
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Landis' The Administrative Process that Congress commit itself to

vote on, in his words, "administrative action . .. of large significance." 57 In 1984, Stephen Breyer, then a court of appeals judge,
showed specifically how Congress could structure a statute to force
itself to vote on agency actions promptly. 58 Judge Breyer framed his
proposal as a way for Congress to reclaim the power that it lost when
Chadhastruck down the legislative veto and so confined it to actions
previously subject to a legislative veto. 59 I proposed that, to stop the
blame-shifting on regulation, Congress should require that Breyer's
fast-track design apply to those regulations defined as major regulations for the purpose of review by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget

(OIRA). 60
Thanks to my book showing, as Dick teaches, how its proposals

would work, it drew forewords from public figures as prominent and
diverse as Governor Howard Dean and Senator Mike Lee. 6 1 Yet, my
public interest campaign that began with Congress's sleight of hand

57 See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEsS 77, 79 (1938). He
argued that for administrative officials, "it was an act of political wisdom to put
back upon the shoulders of Congress" responsibility for such actions. Id. at 76.
58 See generally Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO.
L.J. 785 (1984). If approved by both houses, the bill would be presented to the
President for signature, thus avoiding the objection that doomed the legislative
veto in Chadha. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-951 (1983). The statute
would set deadlines by which the House and Senate must vote, limit debate, and
bar filibusters on such votes. Such an arrangement would be analogous to the fasttrack procedures embraced in both the approval of trade agreement and base closures. See IAN F. FERGUSON & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 22
(2019); CHRISTOPHER T. MANN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., BASE CLOSURE AND
REALIGNMENT (BRAC): BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2-3 (2019).

59 See Breyer, supra 58.
60 See SCHOENBROD, supranote 56, at 152-53; Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f),
58 FR 51735, reprintedas amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012). President Clinton's
executive order was in turn a variation on one issued by President Reagan. See
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866,
58 FR 51735. There would be about as many such regulations as current votes on
symbolic public laws such as those naming post offices. See SCHOENBROD, supra
note 56, at 153. Voting on significant regulations would require legislators to
shoulder more responsibility than voting on the names of post offices, but the Constitution includes voting on regulatory rules in Congress's job description, not
naming post offices. See, e.g,. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
61 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 56, at vii-viii (Governor Dean), viii-ix (Senator Lee).
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on lead in gasoline came to another dead end. 62 The many crises in
the presidency of Donald Trump left little time or energy for longterm concerns such as how Congress could reform itself to better

serve the public.
V
Yet, early in 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a
delegation case, Gundy v. United States. 63 Although the Court rejected the delegation challenge in that case, five justices now seem

interested in limiting delegation in some future case. 64 Justice Gorsuch's dissenting opinion asks, "What's the test?" 65 In other words,
how is this going to work? The answer cannot be the one I long
embraced: that Congress must approve all rules of private conduct.
Although that is what the Constitution means, that cannot be the test

because there are too many such rules for Congress to vote on them
all. Yet, Dick's perpetual question-how is this going to work?-

62 Republicans in Congress put a version of Landis/Breyer into a bill called
Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act (REINS) but presented it
as a way to reduce regulation and thus ensured that the bill would not pass. See
Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, H.R. 26, 115th
Cong. (as passed by House, Jan. 5, 2017). Thus, these Republicans can tell their
base that they are against regulatory burdens without having to vote against specific regulatory protections. Democrats, for their part, are satisfied with the present
statutes under which they can be for regulatory protection without having to vote
for regulatory burdens. As Rep. Tom Cole (R. Okla.) explained at a recent House
Rules Committee hearing, "I have a lot of colleagues on both sides that like to rail
against the administrative state, but they certainly wouldn't want to have to vote
on all those rules and regulations, because they are high risk votes." See House
Rules, Rules Committee Meeting on Article One, YouTUBE (Mar. 10, 2020), at
1:16:36-1:16:47, https://youtu.be/2Y6MoUBJP5U?t-4596.
63 See United States v. Gundy, 695 F..App'x 639 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. granted,
138 S. Ct. 1260 (Mar. 5, 2018) (No. 17-6086).
64 The dissent by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas, called for reinvigorating the norm. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S.
Ct. 2116, 2135 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Alito stated in his concurring opinion that "[i]f a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort." Id. at 2131
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kavanaugh did not participate in
the decision. Later, Justice Kavanaugh wrote an opinion in which he stated that
"Justice Gorsuch's scholarly analysis of the Constitution's nondelegation doctrine
in his Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in future cases." Paul v.
United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
65 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2135 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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had led me to a new answer in the course of writing DC Confidential.66 The Court should strike new rules of private conduct promulgated in regulatory actions that OIRA finds significant unless their
promulgation is approved through the Article I legislative process.6 7
It would be up to Congress to decide whether to arrange to do so

through the process suggested by Landis and Breyer or some other
way. 68

I naturally asked Dick to read a draft of an article suggesting an
answer to Justice Gorsuch's question. 69 This would be my fifth approach to making regulation better serve the public. He started asking questions about how the Court would distinguish the making of
rules of private conduct from their interpretation and enforcementonce again, how is this going to work? It struck me that I was encountering the Socratic method about which I heard so much when
I was a law student but never quite observed back then. Dick's questions led me to clarify my proposal. 70

Richard Stewart became a guiding light when I read his article
on innovation in 1981. Ever since, he has been the scholar whom I
have most cited. Now, four decades later, my laptop tells me that the
file folder that I use most often is labeled "RBS delegation." He is
not only a clear and forceful scholar when explaining his positions,
but he is also a gentle and intelligent colleague that helps others improve their scholarship. Whenever I have asked him for advice, as
with the recent article on delegation, he was more concerned with
helping me to state clearly what I thought rather than getting me to
think what he thought. Without fail, he asks the right question and
answers with precision. He does so because he cares about treating
other people well. He has integrity.

That integrity has led him to improve many, many scholars as
well as institutions of government. His focus on how institutions
work has inspired the creation of new disciplines such as global
66 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 56, at 150-56.
67 See David Schoenbrod, Consent of the Governed: A ConstitutionalNorm

That the Court Should SubstantiallyEnforce, 43 H1ARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 213,

219 (2019).

68 See id. at 257.

69 See id. at 213, 219-24, 253-65 for the relevant portions.
70 See id at 219-24.
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administrative law. His impact on administrative law has been vast,

deep, and transformative.
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